How Democrats Flipped Colorado
Colorado progressives built a new organizational network that overwhelmed Republicans more focused on in-fighting than winning elections.
Colorado may be considered a blue state today, but it was a swing state until the 2008 presidential election.
It wasn’t because of Barack Obama’s candidacy. Instead, it was the Democratic Party’s reorganization in that state that even sheltered Democrats from the 2010 red wave.
The Blueprint is coauthored by journalist Adam Schrager and former Republican member of the Colorado House of Representatives, Rob Witwer. It recounts the pivot that Colorado Democrats made and the weaknesses in the Republican Party that turned Colorado blue. They waste little time explaining what happened:
“First, they [Colorado progressives] built a robust network of nonprofit entities to replace the Colorado Democratic Party, which had been rendered obsolete by campaign-finance reform.” They went on to raise money and select local candidates. Then, “and most important, they put aside their policy differences to focus on the common goal of winning elections.”
Nonprofits After Campaign Finance Reform
In March 2002, President Bush signed a bipartisan campaign finance reform bill into law, which prevented political parties from raising and spending “soft money,” funding for building up a political party instead of spending it on specific candidates.
A small group of Democratic power players in Colorado leapt at the opportunity created for them by being able to cast off their old party and build a new group of organizations that would support local candidates.
Democratic operatives created a network of nonprofit organizations that removed decision-making from traditional party insiders. This gave people like Jared Polis, a successful businessman turned Democratic politician, the ability to allocate funds based on merit instead of connections to party insiders. The authors wrote:
“The Roundtable [small group of Democratic operatives] capitalized on a key provision of post-campaign finance reform election law, namely, that while nonprofits were no longer allowed to coordinate their activities with candidates or political parties, they were perfectly free to coordinate among themselves.”
Four nonprofits raised several million dollars to begin funding campaigns in low-profile races that could flip Republican seats instead of funding names that often gratified donors to be connected to instead of yielding increased Democratic political control.
Why Republicans Couldn’t Strike Back
In 2003, Colorado Republicans attempted to pass a map that would redistrict Colorado to give Republicans an advantage going into the 2004 elections. The map was divisive among voters, and the Supreme Court refused to hear the case in June 2004.
The attempt was led by the state’s most radical Republicans, which hurt Republicans in competitive Colorado races. Redistricting piled onto the social conservatives’ focus on issues like abortion and gay marriage. Republican Ramey Johnson’s race was illustrative of statewide challenges:
“‘There was this arrogance on the Republican side of the aisle that eventually took us all down,’ she said later. ‘The Republican caucus introduced many bills related to social issues—some bills were consciously introduced to put other Republicans ‘on record.’ There was no concern regarding my reelection needs by other members of the caucus or the party.’”
Republican infighting prevented an organized response to Democratic reorganization. That fall, Democrats won both the Colorado House and Senate. Democrats would secure the governor’s mansion in 2006.
The Blueprint captures the powerful ground game that Democrats executed in addition to their high-level reorganization. It contains lessons for anyone interested in watching state-level races during the 2026 midterms—and who are tempted to let intraparty disagreements derail reelection efforts.